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THE JUDGE
It was 1973 when I first went to work as a law clerk forJudgeJustice.
I had been taught by such scholars as Bernard Ward and Charles Alan
Wright, and had been exposed to the debate about the proper limits on
the power of the judiciary; the word "antimajoritarian" was in my vocabulary, and Richard Nixon had made "strict constructionism" a term of
everyday political parlance (if not of clear meaning). But that debate
was neither as sophisticated nor as acrimonious in those days as it has
since become: most of Judge Justice's critics (who were legion) would
then have explained their objections to his judicial style by claiming that
he was "too liberal." To me this was no objection at all; had I not gone
to law school because I wanted to enlist in the battle to save the world
from war, poverty, and injustice?
When I began working for theJudge, I discovered that war and poverty were pretty much outside the Judge's jurisdiction. But injusticethat was different. Although Judge Justice was as particular a scholar as
ever parsed a concurrence, and an excruciatingly careful craftsman,
these skills were the tools of his work, not its raison d'etre. The man
fairly burned with the determination to insure that no person who
soughtjustice from his court would fail to find it-not necessarily victory
or vindication, but justice. The best example of this quality that I can
remember was the matter of the tiny hamburger patty. All of the Judge's
law derks, I suppose like law derks everywhere, dreaded the daily influx
of prisoner petitions. Most of these were complaints from prisoners
held at various facilities of the Texas Department of Corrections within
theJudge's jurisdiction, complaining that their civil rights had been violated by their custodians. Although the sort of case that would have
excited me in the abstract while I was in law school, these prisoner civil
rights cases were unbelievably tedious in practice. The complaints
themselves were inevitably handwritten, often on toilet paper, and usually accompanied by a litany of explanations concerning the difficulties
the inmate had experienced in trying to formulate and write his complaint, coupled with a prayer for the court's forgiveness of his inability to
observe the rules of pleading, filing, and service. Though wearing
enough, this was only the beginning: there then followed a minute description of the many wrongs the prisoner believed he had suffered, all
phrased in often elliptical prison lawyerese. As an academic frequently

faced with the task of grading examinations, I've discovered what may be
the only activity as tedious as reading those prisoner petitions, and for
the same reason: buried under mounds of unnecessary verbiage and
mistaken understandings about the law often may be found important
xvii
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and meritorious claims. And in the Judge's eyes, no failing as a judge
could have been greater than dismissing a prisoner's civil rights suit-no
matter how inartful, intemperate, or illiterate-that contained somewhere in its miserable contents a claim that raised a genuine issue under
the civil rights statutes. Hence the tiny hamburger story.
One day I put a sheaf of routine papers on the Judge's desk for his
approval and signature. Included in this thick pile was a one-page order
dismissing the civil rights petition of a prisoner. The Judge asked me
the nature of his complaint. I told him that this complaint was a rare
one-issue petition, and that the single issue it raised had no legal significance: the prisoner complained that at supper one evening he had been
given a hamburger patty which was much smaller than those served to
all of the other inmates. Even in my zeal for correcting injustice, I
couldn't see that this complaint deserved the attention of a federal
judge. But the Judge was not satisfied. Suppose it was because of race,
or because the inmate spoke out against one of the prison's policies, that
he was not given as much to eat as the others, he suggested. Well, I
replied, he doesn't say so. No? smiled the Judge, but maybe he didn't
know it was important. I rewrote the dismissal order; it dismissed the
complaint, but it also contained the Judge's observation that in the event
the short rations had been a consequence of a prison official's desire to
discriminate or retaliate against the inmate because of his race or his
exercise of his first amendment rights, the case would be a different one.
He signed it and it was sent to the prisoner. (I believed at first this order
would merely serve as an invitation to the inmate to claim that race or
speech had been the reason for the tiny hamburger, but we never heard
from him again.) I've thought about this episode many times, imagining
how it must have felt to that prisoner to open the order and realize the
care with which his complaint had been read. This thoroughness, and
refusal to do things the way they had always been done in East Texas,
was absolutely characteristic of theJudge. And it must be said that there
was a stubbornness, too, that has often made the Judge unwilling to placate or even explain himself to his critics. But the tiny hamburger story,
and hundreds of others like it, belie the claim sometimes made by his
opponents that Judge Justice is a megalomaniac who loves to wield
power. Would such a person have concerned himself with the inadequacies of one miserable prisoner's diet and the possible reasons for it?
Today the character of the debate, both public and scholarly, about
judicial power has changed. Conservative scholars who criticize federal
judges for "noninterpretive" constitutional rulings and the use of creative equitable remedies have made valuable contributions to a healthy
national dialogue about the separation of powers and federalism, but
some have indulged in bitter ad hominem attacks on courageous judges
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who believe they are doing the job they were appointed to do. (One
Texas law professor said in a televised interview that the proper response to the argument that Judge Justice is simply enforcing the Constitution is "to snicker.") Many of these scholars have themselves been
appointed to judgeships during the Reagan administration. But new
voices have also been added to the debate, including those of the Critical Legal Studies movement who apparently believe in the illegitimacy
of all existing legal institutions. To them the term "liberal" is an insult,
and they sometimes seem to have no more sympathy for the painstaking,
professional, and personally costly work of interpreting the law without
fear or favor than those who would abolish the judiciary and permit the
Executive, or the Congress, or the states, to decide everything. This
state of affairs makes defenders ofjudicial constitutional review feel like
flaky radicals and hopelessly outdated reactionaries at the same time.
Outside the law journals and the halls of academe, the public political debate has been less sophisticated, but certainly more colorful. I
was somewhat astonished to hear that the recently elected Governor of
Texas had referred to the Judge as a "goofball." The ritual denunciation of William WayneJustice and his rulings has become practically an
inescapable feature of any East Texas political contest. But there are
signs the political acrimony may be mellowing. I was amused recently to
hear a local East Texas attorney observe (accurately) that "the Judge is a
hell of a lot more conservative than these guys think he is." (It was
meant as a compliment.) JudgeJustice's neverfailing courtesy, good humor, and unimpeachable integrity may finally win over those who actually have the privilege of knowing him. Academic hostility to what is
sometimes called the "activist judiciary" shows no signs of tempering,
however. (I do have some hope that as more former law professors become judges, they will realize that judging may be harder than criticizing, and transmit this message to their former colleagues.)
As I listen to the current debates, often impressed by the learning
and eloquence of the participants, I find that there is much to be said for
judges who are aware of their limitations, and are cautious about imposing their own political beliefs onto their reading of the Constitution.
But the Constitution, as many have observed, does not interpret itself;
the time is past when any judge could credibly claim that he or she decides constitutional questions simply by holding the statute or practice
questioned up to a copy of the Constitution and declaring that the two
are either matched or mismatched. Certainly any judge, whether "conservative" or "liberal," "strict constructionist" or "critical legal
scholar," must bring to the task ofjudging something of his or her essential character and disposition. The question is what constitutes an
ideal judicial disposition. Respect for the limits of the office is, of
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course, essential. But any lawyer, scholar, or citizen who believes that
the nation would be better off without judges of the courage and humanity of William Wayne Justice must be asked the question attributed
to Sir Thomas More: "Do you really believe you could stand upright in
the winds that then would blow?"
MARIANNE WESSON
Associate Professor of Law
University of Colorado School of Law

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law

